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··Nl<<-Fertilisation of Procedural Law Among 
International Courts and Tribunals: 
Methods and Meanings 
Chiara Gior;getti* 
ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals ha.'> resulted in interest-
ing instances of cross-fertilisation of procedural law among international courts. 
This chapter provides a framework to assess specific techniques of cross-fertili-
sation, used in support of specific conclusions reached by the deciding tribunal 
Techniques used include general references to decisions by other tribunals, 
specific citations to one or more decisions by other international courts and 
tribunals and references to a standard adopted by other international courts and 
tribunals explained in a dissenting or separate opinion and differing from the 
conclusion supported by the majority of the deciding tribunal. Continuous 
instances of cross-fertilisation also seem to indicate the initial formation of a 
common international procedural law applicable to a variety of international 
courts and tribunals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals has resulted in important 
developments for international law. On one side, the fragmentation of the 
international legal system became a feared consequence, and attracted numer-
ous and significant studies.l On the other side, it has prompted interesting 
-li:· Associate Professor of Law, Richmond University Law SchooL 
1 Above all see the important study by the International Legal Commission, Conclusions of 
the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion oflntcrnational Law, adopted by d1e International Law 
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instances of cross-fertilisation of substantive and procedural law among 
different international courts.2 Cross-fertilisation among different interna-
tional courts is an important method used by international courts to fill in 
gaps in their statutes and rules of procedures, as well as to strengthen their 
conclusions in line with other international courts and tribunals. In doing so, 
international courts routinely reference customary international law, general 
principles of law and rules developed in other international judicial and arbi-
tral practice. 3 This chapter focuses specifically on references to decisions of 
other international judicial and arbitral bodies as a central instrument used to 
fill in the gaps and avoid a non-liquet, to ensure that courts can properly 
support their decisions; and as an example of cross-fertilisation and develop-
ment of international law. 
A real understanding of the extent and depth of this important phenome-
non is now beginning to emerge.4 Thus far, preference has been given 
primarily to the assessment and understanding of exchanges related to 
substantive issues. 5 Yet, procedural standards are at the core of fair process, 
and cross-fertilisation is also occurring in procedural matters. These include 
fundamental issues of party equality, the requirement to ensure integrity of 
proceedings, issues related to third party intervention, timeliness and the 
requirements necessary to grant preliminary measures as well the extent of 
their binding nature. As explained below, they also include core issues relat-
Commission at its :Fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part 
of the Commission's report covering the work of that session (A/61/10, para 251), Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two <http://lcgal.tm.org/ilc/tens/ 
instmmcnts/english/drafto/o20articles/1_9 _ 2006. pdf>. 
2 In addition to the chapters in this book generally; sec also, for example, RJ Goldstone and 
RJ Hamilton, 'Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the Encow1ter of the International Court of 
Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' {2008) 21{1) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 95, 110; C Giorgetti, 'Horizontal and Vertical Relationships of 
International Courts and Tribunals - How Do We Address their Competing Jurisdiction!' 
(2015) 30 ICSID Review 98; J Pauwelyn, 'Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International 
Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands' (2004} 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 
903; l'G Jacobs, 'Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-fertilisation of Legal Systems: The European 
Court of Justice' (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 547; A Watts, 'Enhancing the 
Efl:tctiveness of Procedures of International Dispute Settlement' in JA Frowein and R Wolfrum 
( eds. }, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public 
Law and International Law 2001) vol 5, 29-30; A Pellet, 'The Case Law of the ICJ in 
Investment Arbitration' (2013) 28 ICSID Review 223; andY Lupu and E Voeten, 'Precedent 
in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the European Court of 
Human Rights' (2012) 42 British Journal of Political Science 413. 
3 C Brown, A Common Law ofinternationalAd:fudication (OUP 2007) 52-55. A note on the 
terminology used: international courts and tribw1al~ and international judicial and arbitral 
bodies/practice are used interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
4 On this and related issues, sec idem. 
5 B Chen and G Schwarzcnberger, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts 
and 'Bibunals (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
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to evidence, including tbe standard and burden of proof, d1e kind of 
adrnissible evidence, tbe role played by expert witnesses and counsel, and tbe 
of a tribunal to seek evidence and to exallline witnesses. Amongst all 
mese instances, we see international courts and tribunals borrowing from 
another's decisions on several similar issues with which they are 
confrontetl, while also maintaining differing standards of fairness in oilier 
of meir respective proceedings. 
ch;tpt•er provides a framework to assess several specific techniques of 
cr<>ss·feJct:ilisalcioJG. The assessment is principally based on me key means avail-
to evaluate this phenomenon: tbe assessment of decisions published by 
variety of international courts and tribunals. Cross-fertilisation techniques 
used botb in support of specific conclusions reamed by me deciding 
2tribwaal or as a way to amend previous conclusions reached by me court or 
dissenting and separate opinions to call for me adoption of s different stan-
QaJ[Q J:ruJm tbe standard used by tbe majority. Techniques used include general 
' references to decisions by oilier tribunals, specific citations of one or more 
decisions by od1er international courts and tribunals and references to a stan-
dard adopted by oilier international courts and tribunals explained in a 
dissenting or separate opinion and differing from tbe conclusion supported 
by me majority of me deciding tribunal. 
It is me purpose of this chapter to consider a variety of international courts 
and tribunals, including inter-State courts like tbe International Court of 
'}U~U·, A (ICJ or me Court), permanent international hwman rights courts like 
me Inter-American Court of Hwman Rights and investn1ent arbitral 
tribunals, such as mose constituted under me Convention on the Setdement 
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Oilier States 
(ICSID Convention). Indeed, it is a fundamental argument of this chapter 
mat me techniques analysed in it are common to international courts and 
tribunals, and tbat cross-fertilisation amongst tribunals is a continual and 
standard practice. What this also signifies is the initial formation - a sort of 
prolegomenon - of a common international procedural law applicable to a 
variety of international courts and tribunals which is developing tbe essential 
core of procedural fairness. 6 
To note, as a consequence of me generally accepted but not formal under-
standing of judicial hierarchy, whim sees decisions oftbe ICJ playing a funda-
mental role in international decision-making, ICJ decisions are tbe ones cited 
most regularly by oilier courts. The ICJ is a court mat produces relatively few 
procedural decisions - yet tbey are usually quite significant. As Malcolm 
Shaw observes, 'increasing co-operation between me International Court of 
6 See in general, the seminal work by Brown (n 3). On d1e difficulty of identif)ring a 
common core of procedural fairness, or a mllversal model, sec the chapters by Filippo Fontanelli 
and Paolo Busco and by Annan Sarvarian and Rudy Balte1; in this volume. 
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Justice and other judicial bodies is takiug place and all the relevant courts and 
tribunals are well aware of each other's work'.? Indeed, citations to decisions 
of other courts and tribunals are also common and 'it is not rare for interna-
tional courts of one type or another to cite each other's decisions'. 8 
This chapter will develop as follows: it will first examine what the courts 
do and how they do it by looking at examples of cross-fertilisation used by a 
court in support of existing standards, and then by exploring the use of refer-
ences to decisions by other judicial and arbitral bodies to depart from stan-
dards already established. Finally, it will assess why courts adopt these 
methodologies and will consider the significance of these techniques as a 
method for cross-fertilisation, as well as appraise critically the importance of 
the phenomenon of cross-fertilisation. 
A word of caution is due on the scope of this chapter. As with most 
comparative and general studies, this chapter is not and does not seek to be 
an exhaustive treatment of all existing examples of cross-pollination in inter-
national procedural law. Rather, it seeks to provide examples of possible 
methodologies and techniques used by international courts and tribunals to 
internalise and expand their understanding of procedural rules and find 
support in decisions by other international courts and tribunals. This 
phenomenon is central to the development of international law and the initial 
development of a common international procedural practice. Importantly, 
the focus of this chapter is limited specifically to cross-fertilisation and high-
lights its importance and legal bases. It does not focus on instances in which 
courts have reasoned in isolation from each other and without engaging in 
judicial dialogue. Indeed, the limited confmes of this analysis carmot assess 
the extent to which cross-fertilisation overweighs opposing phenomena, nor 
does it attribute these conducts to specific courts. An important observation 
and argument of this chapter is that exploring instances of cross-fertilisation 
is instructive and important per se for our understanding of the international 
judicial and arbitral system and of the development of procedural interna-
tional law generally. 
II. CROSS FERTILISATION USED IN SUPPORT OF EXISTING STANDARDS 
The most common demonstration of cross-fertilisation of procedural matters 
among different international courts and tribunals is exemplified by direct 
references to determinations of other international courts in support of a 
specific conclusion by the deciding court. This is a common exercise that 
international courts often undertake. This kind of simple cross-fertilisation 
7 1v1N Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 810. 
8 Ibid, 79. 
a Gior;getti 
king place and all the relevant courts 
:r's work'.? Indeed, citations to decisiiom 
J common and ~it is not rare for ml~erna· 
to cite each other's decisions'. 8 
•ws: it will first examine what the 
: examples of cross-fertilisation used 
~' and then by exploring the use ~•·--•~c 
and arbitral bodies to depart from 
it will assess why courts adopt 
1e significance of these techniques 
ll as appraise critically the importance 
n. 
1e scope of tins chapter. As with 
~ chapter is not and does not seek to 
1g examples of cross-pollination in 
seeks to provide examples of 
by international courts and tribunals 
rstanding of procedural rules and 
ternational courts and tribunals. 
pment of international law and the 
.tiona! procedural practice. 
pecifically to cross-fertilisation and 
. It does not focus on instances in 
om each other and without en~~aging 
d confines of tllis analysis cannot 
n overweighs opposing phenomena, 
pecific courts. An important ob:senrati 
exploring instances of crc>Ss-.fertilisati 
•r our understanding of the u· ltermLtio 
the development of procedural 
N SUPPORT OF EXISTING STANDARDS 
f cross-fertilisation ofpnx<:dr~rall rntat 
s and tribunals is exemplified by 
Ler international courts in support 
court. This is a common · 
'· This kind of simple 
:UP 2014) 810. 
Cross-Fertilisation of Procedural Law: Methods and Meanings 22 7 
be done in a more or less explicit way, and it is an important demonstra-
of the existence of a continuous judicial dialogue and of the influence 
decisions of courts and tribunals can play in the decisions of other courts. 
Incleeoj, in his seminal study on this issue, Chester Brown asserts that 'inter-
1ati.on:al con:rts have often demonstrated their readiness to allow their proce-
and remedies to be informed by the practice of other international 
~ib•unals'. 9 Decisions in support of existing standards can take a variery of 
and citations can be either general or specific to a particular decision 
court. 
This technique of seeking support from decisions by other courts and 
ribunals has been used in many contexts that are essential to guaranteeing 
process, including the powers and requirements to grant prelinlinary 
1ea;mr•es and a variery of matters related to evidence, such as the burden of 
the applicable standard of proof and the kind of evidence.10 
First, in certain instances, especially when a specific legal conclusion is 
a decision of the court seeking support may ouly refer 
~enerally to the support found for that conclusion in the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals. For example, in the case of the EC-
:amma:s, the appellate body of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was 
•pnfro•nt•edwith the question of whether member States were allowed to use 
con:nsel in dispute settlement proceedings11 In fmding in the affir-
the panel sought support from a variery of son:rces, and concluded 
it had found nothing in the WTO Agreement, tile Dispute Settlement 
Jmlerstandinl'' the Working Procedures, in customary international law 'or 
ore:va:mn"' practice of international tribunals' 12 that would prevent a 
WTO from deternliuing the composition of its delegation in 
:rocc,edings of the appellate body. 
Cr•oss-fertilisation also occn:rs by direct references to specific international 
and to specific decisions of these courts. For example, tllis approach 
Brown (n 3), 4. Contra, but outside the scope of this chapter, see the dictum in the dcci-
of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Bormer Yugoslavia 
Tadic, Case No IT-94-l-AR72, ICL 36 (ICTY 1995) (2 October 1995); abo cited 
'International law, because it lacks a centralized structure, docs not provide for an 
judicial system operating an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals, 
certain aspects or components of jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or central-
in one of them but not the others. In international law, every tribunal is a self-contained 
(unless otherwi~e provided)'. 
R Teitelbaum, 'Recent Fact-Finding Developments at the International Court 
(2007) 6(1) The Law and Practice oflnternational Courts and Tribunals 119, 130. 
evidentiary matters, see the chapters by James Devaney, Hugh Thirlway and Brooks Daly 
Hugh Meighen in this volume. 
Brown (n 3), 4. 
EC- Regime for ImportationJ Sale and Distribution ofBananas, DSR 1997-II, 591, 599 [10]. 
the chapter by Chi Carmody in dlls volume. 
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was adopted by another decision of the dispute settlement body of the WTO 
in US - Shirts and Blouses, where it explored issues related to the burden of 
proof. In confrrming the application of the principle of actori incumbit 
tio in WTO proceedings, the Appellate Body held that: 
[V]arious international tribunals, including the International Court of ·• 
Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that 
the party who asserts the fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is 
responsible for providing proof thereof.13 
These kinds of citations are fairly common in international decisions.l4 
Although the WTO panels ilo not make direct references to general princi-
ples of international law, the wording used seems to indicate that the refer-
ences to 'generally and consistently accepted' decisions by other courts should 
be seen as akin to general principles of law. 15 
Interestingly, moreover, the same legal conclusion can also at frrst be cited 
only generally and then evolve into a more specific citation in a separate case, 
or also, include a more specific citation witllin the same decision. For exam-
ple, in Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) assessed the obligation of parties to abstain from 
acts that might be of prejudicial effect on the outcome of the judgment in the 
context of the power of granting provisional measures. In reaching its conclu-
sion, the PCIJ offered as support the existence of 'the principle universally 
accepted by international tribunals'16 that required parties to a case to abstain 
from any measures that would have prejudicial effects in relation to the execu-
tion of a future decision. 
The same point was also directly cited in support of the fmding by the ICJ 
in La Grand on the binding nature of preliminary measures orders. In that 
occasion, the Court affirmed that: 
A related reason which points to the binding character of orders made 
under Article 41 and to which the Court attaches importance is the exis-
tence of a principle which has already been recognised by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice when it spoke of "the principle universally 
13 US - Shirts and Blouses, WT/DS33/AB/R, DSR 1997-1, 323, 338. See ) Pauwdyn, 
'Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Bears the Burden?' (1998) 
l Journal of International Economic Law 227, 229. 
14 Sec, for example, Brown (n 3), 94-95; and Goldstone and Hamilton (n 2). 
15 See further the discussions in the chapters by Elippo Fontandli and Paolo Busco and by 
Arman Sarvarian and Rudy Baker, in this volume. 
I6 Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Order dated 5 December 1939, PCIJ Series A(B, 
No. 79, 199. On the issue, see generally S Rosenne, PriWisWnal Measures in Intcrnatiottal Law 
(OUP 2004). 
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accepted by international tribunals and likewise laid down in many 
conventions . . . to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from 
any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to ilie 
execution of the decision to be given, .and, in general, not allow any step 
of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend ilie dispute". 17 
is an interesting example that also demonstrates the development in the 
tnliDWlg of the Court from a reference to a general principle to a direct cita-
a decision of its predecessor as specific recognition of a principle as 
recognised by the other court and also used as a source of law. 
Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights used botl1 general 
specific reference to decisions of other international courts in the semi-
ftltisquez Rodriguez case.18 In that case, the court assessed in detail issues 
related to the burden of proof as well as ilie general criteria to consider in 
evaluating and reaching fmdings of facts in the proceedings. The court noted 
first that, because the commission was accusing the Government of 
Honduras of the disappearance of Mr. Velasquez, it was the commission iliat, 
in principle, should bear the burden of proving the facts underlying tl1e 
request. The commission, however, argued that because policies of disap-
pearances, whether supported or tolerated by a government, are specifically 
designed to conceal and destroy evidence of disappearances, if the existence 
of such polices are demonstrated, it would be sufficient to prove the disap-
pearance of a particular individual through circumstantial or indirect evidence 
or by logical inference. Neither Honduras nor tl1e court found the commis-
sion's argument objectionable, so that the question remaining for ilie court 
was to establish the standard of proof to be used in the case to prove the exis-
tence of the practice and whether Mr. Velasquez's disappearance was linked 
to that practice. Citing several decisions of the ICJ in support of its state-
ments, the court observed that it had to 
determine what the standards of proof should be in the instant case. 
Neither the Convention, the Statute of the Court nor its Rules of 
Procedure speak to this marter. Nevertheless, international jurisprudence 
has recognized ilie power of the courts to weigh the evidence freely, 
although it has always avoided a rigid rule regarding the amount of proof 
necessary to support the judgment ( Cfr. Corfu Channel, Merits, 
17 LaGrand (Cnmnany v United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 
2001,466, para 103. The Court cites directly Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (n 16) as 
well as numerous subsequent cases decided along tl1c same line. 
18 Applicable Standards of proof in VCldsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Intcr-
AmCtHR {Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), paras 122-137. On this case, see also the chapter by Lucas 
Lixinski in this volume. 
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Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, paras. 29-30 and 59-60). 19 
The court then also referred to decisions by international courts generally. It 
first stated that 'the standards of proof are less formal in an international legal 
proceeding than in a domestic one'. 20 The court then recognised the serious-
ness of a fmding that a State party could have tolerated or carried out a prac-
tice of disappearances in its territory and noted that that required the court 
to apply a standard of proof that took into consideration the seriousness of 
the charge.21 The court again found support in decisions by other interna-
tional courts and stated that 'the practice of international and domestic 
courts' showed that direct testimonial or documentary evidence was not the 
only type of evidence that a court could legitimately consider when reaching 
a decision. Indeed, courts could also consider circwnstantial evidence, indi-
cia, and presumptions, so long as they led to conclusions consistent with the 
facts 22 The court then concluded that this principle was generally valid in 
international proceedings, especially, in the context of human rights cases. 23 
This short tour d'horizon provides a framework to understand one of the 
most common cross-fertilisation techniques used by international courts to 
enhance their decision - citing decisions of other courts and tribunals. Direct 
citations can refer to general principles/conclusions common to all interna-
tional courts and tribunals or, more often, a specific court or specific deci-
sions by a specific court. Before assessing the legal foundations and the 
queries that may arise from this methodology. the next section will explore 
instances of cross-fertilisation used to depart from a standard already estab-
lished by the deciding court. 
III. CROSS FERTILISATION USED TO DEPART FROM ALREADY 
ESTABLISHED STANDARDS 
Interestingly, cross-fertilisation is also found in instances where decisions of 
international courts or tribunals are used by the deciding tribunal, or a 
19 Ibid, para 127. 
20 Ibid, para 128. 
21 Ibid, para 129. 
22 Ibid, para 130. 
23 Ibid, para 133. The court interestingly also noted that 'Since the Government only offered 
some documentary evidence in support of its preliminary objections, but none on the merits, the 
Court must reach its decision without the valuable assistance of a more active participation by 
Honduras, which might otherwise have resulted in a more adequate presentation of its case', 
para 137. 
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therein, to support and introduce a change in the previously used 
Similar to the techniques explored above, references can be to 
or specific decisions or courts. A call for a change in the procedural 
used by a court can also be seen in a dissenting or separate opinion 
one or more judges who question a specific decision by the majority of the 
and cite in support the different standards used by other international 
and tribunals, calling for the adoption of that different standard. 
An important exatnple of this is seen in the fertile context of provisional 
'ne118ures. For example, the ICJ was confronted with the question of the rela-
iontshiip between the power of international courts and tribunals to grant 
>rov:isiorral measures and the question of their jurisdiction on the merits. 
5pe:cifically, the issue the ICJ was called to resolve was whether a clear estab-
·~~:~~~~ jurisdiction over the merits was necessary for the Court to grant 
'_p measures, or whether the question of jurisdiction was irrelevant 
the purpose of issuing provisional measures. . 
In this context, Judge Hersch Lauterpacht first proposed to use a pnma 
test in his separate opinion in the Interhandel case where he declared 
that 
The correct principle which emerges from these apparently conflicting 
considerations and which has been uniformly adopted in international 
arbitral and judicial practice is as follows: The Court may properly act 
under the terms of Article 41 provided that there is in existence an instru-
ment such as a Declaration of AcceptatKe of the Optional Clause, emanat-
ing from the Parties to the dispute, which prima facie confers jurisdiction 
upon the Court and which incorporates no reservation obviously exclud-
ing its jurisdiction. 24 
ln this case, Judge Lauterpacht referred to a principle uniformly adopted by 
other international courts and a reference to general principles of law, as the 
correct principle to be adopted, using tl1e example set by other courts and 
tribunals to urge the ICJ to also adopt that conclusion. 25 
Importantly, the prima facie test developed by Judge Lauterpacht was subse-
quently adopted by the entire Court as the correct test to grant provisional 
24 Interhandel (Switzerland -v United States of America), Order of 24 October 1957, Request 
for the indication of interim measures of protection, ICJ Reports 1957, 105, Separate Opinion 
ofJudge Lauterpacht, 117, 118-119. 
25 Interbandel, Order (n 24), stating that'[ w ]hereas the Court, in order to decide what action 
should be taken in pursuance of the request, mmt, in accordance with Article 41 of the Statute, 
ascertain what is required by the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the Parties 
pending d1e decision of the Court'. 
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measures, including, for example, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case26 and the 
Nuclear Tests case. 27 More recently, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo, the Court again confirmed-
Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before 
deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfY itself that it has 
jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate such 
measures unless the provisions invoked by tl1e applicant appear, prima 
facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be 
established; whereas moreover, once the Court has established the exis-
tence of such a basis for jurisdiction, it should not however indicate 
measures for the protection of any disputed rights other than those which 
might ulrimately form the basis of a judgment in the exercise of that juris-
diction28 
In this case, general conclusions uniformly adopted by other international 
courts and tribunals were introduced first to the deciding court, the ICJ, by 
a separate opinion which then became the standard adopted by the majority 
in subsequent decisions. 
Cross-fertilisation can also be seen in more direct reference to specific deci-
sions by other international courts and tribunals. A recent example of this 
technique can be found in the dissenting opinion that Judges Sinuna and Al-
Khasawneh appended to the Pulp Mills decision. 29 The strongly-worded 
26 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Iceland) Order 
of 17 August 1972, Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1972, 12, para 17: 'Whereas the above· 
cited provision in an instrument emanating from both Parties to the dispute appears, prima facie, 
to afford a possible basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be fotmded.'; see also para 
34: 'Whereas the above-cited provision in an instrument emanating from both Parties to the 
dispute appears, prima facie, to afford a possible basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court 
might be fi>W1dcd'. 
27 Nuclear "Iksts Case (Australia v .France), Order of 22 June 1973, Request for the indication 
of interim measures of protection, fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial case, 
ICJ Reports 1973, 135, para 13: 'Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need 
not, before indicating them, finally satisfY itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, 
and yet ought not to indicate such measures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant 
appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Comt might be founded'. 
211 Armed Activities on the 'Rrritmy of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Rwanda), Provi<;ional Measures, Order of lO July 2002, ICJ Reports 2002,241, 
para 58; see also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Order of 13 July 2006, 
Request for the Indication of Provisional Mcasmcs, ICJ Reports 2006, 113, para 57: 'Whereas 
in dealing with a request for provisional measmes, the Court need not finally satisfY itself that it 
has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, but will not indicate such measures unless the provi-
sions invoked by the applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of 
the Court might be established'. 
29 Sec further d1c chapter by James Devaney in this volume. 
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dissenting opinion related to the use of experts in international proceedings, 
rightly urging the court to allow the direct exanlination of experts, to distin-
guish between counsel and experts and to name its own experts in cases that 
rely heavily on complex scientific information. Judges Simma and Al-
Khasawneh make a thorough smdy of the existing jurisprudence on the 
matter both by the ICJ and by other courts and tribunals. On the issue of the 
court's nomination of experts, they noted that the Court had already invoked 
its powers under this provision in the past and cited several cases in support 
of their statement. 30 Then they remarked that 'this reliance on experts is all 
the more unavoidable in cases concerned with highly complex scientific and 
technological facts' such as that particular case, which included issues related 
to the possible chain of causation of pollution of certain chemicals. 31 
Finally, tl1ey cited decisions of several other tribunals stating that 'other 
international bodies have accepted the reality of the challenges posed by 
scientific uncertainty in the judicial process: in Iron Rhine Railway (Belgium/ 
Netherlands), Arbitral Award, 24 May 2005 [ ... ] the Tribunal recommended 
that the parties establish a committee of independent experts to determine 
several scientifically complex facts'.32 They convincingly found support in 
numerous decisions by the WTO, concluding tl1at the WTO had contributed 
most to the development of a best practice of assessing complex scientific 
evidence. 33 
30 Pulp Mills 011 the River Uruguay (A1lferttirta v Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April20l0, ICJ 
Reports 2010, 14, Joint dissenting opinion Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma, para 10: 'Art 50 
of the ICJ Statute granting the Court the power to appoint expert'>'. In the Cmfit Channel case 
(United Kingdom v Albania), Order of 17 December 1948, ICJ Reports 1947-1948, 124, exer-
cising its powers under article 50 of the ICJ Statute, the Court conunissioned tluee naval experts 
to evaluate visibility off the Albanian coast in order to substantiate the United IGngdom's claim, 
based on a finding of fact, that Albania could have seen various mine-laying operations occur-
ring off its coast. In Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine AI·ca 
(Canada/United States of America), Appointment of Expert, Order of 30 March 1984, ICJ 
Reports 1984, 165, 166, the Court, upon a joint request of the Parties, and again using its 
powers under article 50 of the ICJ Statute, appointed an expert 'in respect of technical ntatters 
and ... in preparing the description of the maritime boundary and the charts ... ' That expert's 
report was annexed to the Court's later Judgment in that dispute (Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, 
347). 
3\ Pulp Mills (n 30), para 11. 
32 Ibid, para 15. 
33 Ibid, para 16: 'Various WTO panels have heard d1e experts put forward by the parties, have 
made recourse to specialized international organizations or agencies for informacion, or have 
outright heard the views of experts appointed by the Panel (see, e.g., European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, 
WT/DS48/R/CAN, WfjDS26/AB/R, WTjDS48/AB/R (1998), DSR 1998,II, 235; European 
Communities- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the 
United States, WTjDS26jRjUSA, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (1998), DSR 199S,m, 
699; European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
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In calling for the adoption by the ICJ of an approach similar to the one 
used by other international courts and tribunals, the judges interestingly 
concluded that not doing so in that dispute had been 'a wasted opportunity 
for the Court'. 34 In contrast to other decisions cited in this section, this has 
not reached full circle and the ICJ has not (yet?) espoused the position of the 
minority. That being said, the thorough citations of cases decided by other 
international courts and tribunals are remarkable and remain an interesting 
example of a cross-fertilisation technique. 
Another interesting example of cross-fertilisation that begins with a call to 
adopt a new standard in a separate or dissenting opinion is found when a new 
standard is first developed in a separate opinion, and is then adopted by the 
majority of the court, and eventually by other international courts and 
tribunals. One notable case relates to the allocation of the burden of proof for 
matters to be decided prior to the fmal judgment of the merits. In her now 
famous separate opinion in the jurisdictional phase of the Oil Platforms case, 
then Judge Rosalyn Higgins developed a new test on the burden of proof 
related to preliminary jurisdictional objections. In her separate opinion, she 
first explained that the Court had to decide important questions related to the 
methodology for determining whether a particular claim fell within the 
compromissory clause of a specific treaty cited by Iran as a basis for jurisdic-
tion for some of its claims, and then noted that she had thought it useful to 
briefly address the issue, not least because of a marked uncertainty in the 
practice of the Court. 35 
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (2006); Canada - Continued 
Suspension of Obligations in the EC- Hormones Dispute, WTJDS32l/R, WT/DS32l/AB/R 
(2008); United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC- Hormones Dispute, 
WT/DS320/R, WTJDS320/AB/R (2008)). The consultation of tribw1al-appointed scientific 
experts by WTO panels may take place even where the parties have not so requested (as in 
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, 
WT/DS58/ AB/R (1998), DSR 1998: VII, 2821) and even if the parties have agreed that such 
outside consult;ltion is unnecessary (as occurred in EC-Biotech, Panel Report, para 7.16). 
Between three and six experts are usually appointed in a two-stage consultation process, compris-
ing both written and oral phases. During the latter phase, parties are invited during a "Joint 
Meeting" to comment on the expert reports as well as the comments of the opposing party (this 
procedure was first used in the WTO US-Shrimp case). This second, oral phase is particularly 
interesting because of the opportunity it affords to the panel and the parties for explanation of 
the concepts, methods and principles that underlie scientific arguments, and thus to improve 
their overall level of 1mdcrstanding of the science at play in a given case. Regrettably, a similar 
course of action was not adopted here'. Sec the chapter by Chi Carmody in this volume, for 
fnrthcr analysis of the WTO's practice in evidentiary matters. 
34 Ibid, para 17. On this point, see B Simma, 'The International Court of Justice and 
Scientific Expertise' (2012) 106 in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 230-233. 
35 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Judgment of 12 December 
1996, Preliminary Objection, ICJ Reports 1996, 803, Separate Opinion ofJudgc Higgins, paras l 
and2. 
·a Giorgetti 
te ICJ of an approach similar to 
: and tribunals, the judges iut<ores:tiiJ 
: dispute had been 'a wasted oppo:rtui 
er decisions cited in this section, 
as not (yet?) espoused the position 
ough citations of cases decided by 
ere remarkable and remain an int:er<~t 
mque. 
ross-fertilisation that begins with a 
'r dissenting opinion is found when 
:rate opinion, and is then adopted 
:tally by other international courts 
) the allocation of the burden d~··-~" 
fmal judgment of the merits. In 
sdictional phase of the Oil Platforms 
oped a new test on the burden of 
objections. In her separate op'inioon, 
decide important questions 
ether a particular claim fell within 
treaty cited by Iran as a basis for 
n noted that she had thought it 
because of a marked uncertainty in 
WT/DS293/R (2006); Canada -
manes Dispute, WTjDS32l/R, W1[/DIS3:Zlj& 
ion of Obligations in the EC- Hormones 
The consultation of tribunal-appointed 
~n where the parties have not so :ci.~;';.~,~";' 
:tain Shrimp and Shrimp Product.-;, 
2821) and even if the parties have agreed 
curred in EC-Biotech, Panel Report, para 
ointed in a two-stage consultation process, 
he latter phase, parties are invited during 
as well as the comments of the opj'os'ing P""Y( 
hrimp case). This second, oral 
ords to the panel and the parties for exr,Janatio 
Jnderlie scientific arguments, and thus to 
:ience at play in a given case. Regrettably, a 
;c the chapter by Chi Carmody in this 
identiary matters. 
Simma, 'The International Court of Justice 
lings of the Annual Meeting (American 
United States of Am.en'ca), Judgment of 12 
96, 803, Separate Opinion ofJudge Higgins, 
Cross-Fertilisation of Procedural Law: Methods and Meanings 235 
After a thorough review of the methodologies used by the ICJ in its previ-
cases, Judge Higgins explained that, in the 1953 Ambatielos case, the 
had rejected the claim of the United Kingdom that the Court should 
iro•vision:tlly accept the facts as asserted and see if they would constitute a 
the Treaty which was the basis for the Court's jurisdiction. The 
asserted that finding that the facts would constitute a violation was to 
into the merits which had been reserved to another adjudicative body.36 
then suggested that: 
This constraint does not operate in the present case. It is interesting to 
note that in the Mavrommatis case the Permanent Court said it was neces-
sary, to establish its jurisdiction, to see if the Greek claims 'would' involve 
a breach of the provisions of the article. This would seem to go too far. 
Only at the merits, after deployment of evidence, and possible defences, 
may 'could' be converted to 'would'. The Court should thus see if, on the 
facts as alleged by Iran, the United States actions complained of might 
violate the Treaty articles. 37 
ntcoresti11gl.y, the test has been cited with approval by many subsequent inter-
!atl<mal tribunals. In Plama, for example, the ICSID Tribunal concluded: 
As regards the burden of proof on the Respondent's jurisdictional objec-
tion, the Tribunal adopts the test proffered by Judge Higgins in her sepa-
rate opinion in d1e Oil Platforms Case. 38 
Plama Tribunal also noted that it did not understand that 'Judge 
'Ii!w:ins' approach is in any sense controversial, eid1er at large or as between 
to these proceedings' and accordingly, applied that approach to the 
lrisilictional issues to be considered in the case. 39 The Tribunal interestingly 
confirmed that the same approach had subsequendy been followed by 
international arbitration tribunals 'deciding jurisdictional objections 
a r-esr>ortd<:ntState against a claimant investor, including,Methanexv USA, 
Phili~pines and Salini v Jordan'.4D 
36 Ibid, para 33. 
37 Ibid, para 33 (emphasis added). 
Plama Consortium Limited v Republic ofBulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 
urisdicti·o n, 8 February 2005, para 118: <http:/Jwww.italaw.com/sites/default/filcs/case-docu-
39 Ibid, para 
40 Ibid, para 119, citing Salini Costruttori S.pA and Italstrade S.pA v The Hashemite Kingdom 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Award of 15 November 2004 <http://ww"v.world-
":~;;::~·.~ ~i·~· On this point, see in general A Pellet, 'The Case Law of the ICJ in Investment 
..rl (2013) 28(2) ICSID Review 223. See further the chapters by Brooks Daly and 
Meighen and Oonagh Sands in this voltmle. 
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Finally, decisions of other tribunals may be cited to endorse a new stan-
dard by the majority of the deciding tribunal. One notable example of this 
tecbnique relates to the correct standard to be used to decide on challenges 
of arbitrators in the context of international investment disputes. Grounds to 
challenge international arbitrators are generally similar in different interna-
tional arbitration rules, and they pertain to an alleged lack of independence 
or impartiality by the arbitrators. Most arbitration rules require situations 
that give rise to 'justifiable doubts' as to the impartiality or independence of 
an arbitrator.41 ICSID rules, however, require a party to propose the disqual-
ification of an arbitrator 'on account of any fact indicating a mauifest lack of 
the qualities' of impartiality or independence. 42 
The standard has been criticised as too difficult to meet. Several ICSID 
tribunals have addressed the issue and have slowly moved towards changing 
the required standard to the generally accepted standard, while continuiog to 
respect the applicable rules.43 In Caratube v Kazakhstan, the ICSID Tribunal 
noted: 
Having considered the Parties' respective positions and in the light of 
recent ICSID jurisprudence, the Unchallenged Arbitrators fmd that the 
applicable burden of proof is expressed in the Decision on the Parties' 
Proposal to DisqualifY a Majority of the Tribunal in Blue Bank 
InternatWnal & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of venezuela, as 
subsequendy confirmed in Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
Repsol SA. and Rcpsol Butano SA. v. Republic of Argentina andAbaclat and 
Others v. Argentine Republic. In these cases, Dr. Kim Yong Kim, the 
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council found that 'Articles 57 
and 14(1) of the ICSID Convention do not require proof of actual depen-
dence or bias; rather it is sufficient to establish the appearance of depen-
dence or bias'. Therefore, the Claimants must show that a third party 
would fmd that there is an evident or obvious appearance oflack of impar-
41 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art 12(1) (2010). 
42 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 <https:/ficsid.worldbank.org!ICSID/ICSID/ 
RulesMain.jsp> (providing 'A party may propose to a Commission or Tribunal the disqualifica-
tion of any of its members on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities 
required'). 
43 C Giorgctti, 'Caratube v. Kazakhstan: For the First Time Two ICSID Arbitrators Uphold 
Disqualification of Third Arbitrator' (ASli Insights, 29 September 2014) vol 22, issue 18 
<http:jjwww.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/22/caratube-v-kazakhstan-first-time-rwo-icsid-
arbitrators-uphold>. For a review of the earlier jurispmdencc, see C Giorgetti, 'Challenges of 
Arbitrators in International Disputes: Two Tribunals Reject the «Appearance of Bias" Standard' 
(ASIL Insights, 6 June 2012) voll6, issue 20 <http:/Jwww.asil.org/insightsjvolumc/16/issue/ 
20/challengcs-arbitrators-international-disputes-two-tribunals-reject-> . 
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tialiry or independence based on a reasonable evaluation of the facts in the 
present case. 44 
measured shift in position of the Tribunal is supported by other deci-
of od1er ICSID tribunals and as such also refers to a standard used by 
international investment tribunals. To conclude, the analytical frame-
described in this section highlights the variety of cross-fertilisation tern-
international courts use to shift from already established standards by 
examples from decisions of other international courts and 
next section will elaborate on the meauings and motives of 
IV. CROSS-FEBTILISATION AMONGST COURTS: MEANINGS AND MOTIVES 
explaining how international courts use citations of other international 
in their judgments, it is inlportant to understand why international 
and tribunals resort to such cross-fertilisation methods and the legal 
impli,catioriS thereof. The proliferation of international courts and tribunals 
been unsystematic and no judicial hierarchy has been established. Whilst 
this phenomenon has resulted in fragmentation and self-contained reginles, it 
.• has also produced an inter-connected system of courts, which has resulted in 
cross-fertilisation. The legal bases to support cross-fertilisation among inter-
national courts are varied. 
International courts refer to decisions of other courts when confronted 
with an issue not exhaustively covered in their constitutive instruments and 
rnles of procedure. This can happen because of a real lacuna in the instru-
ments, or because of an ambiguity in the instruments. There are several ways 
used by international courts to fill in the gaps by interpreting and applying 
rules of procedure that are consistent wid1 d10se used by other international 
courts and tribunals. 
As explained by Brown, courts can interpret their statutes and rules of 
procedure in a way that takes into account the practice of other international 
courts and tribunals. 45 To do so, he identifies iliree principal methods: first, 
44 Caratube International Oil Company LLP & M1: De-pincci Salah Hourani v Republic of 
Kaza!d1stan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. 
Bruno Boesch, para 57 (20 March 2014) <http://italaw.com/sites/defaultjfilesjcase-docu-
ments/italaw3133.pdf>. Sec also, Blue Batth Int'l & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v Bolivarian Repuhlic of 
Tfnezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties' Proposals to Disqualify a 
Majority of the Tribunal (12 November 2013) <http:/fwww.italaw.com/sitesjdefault/filcs/case-
documcnts/italaw3009. pdf>. 
45 Brown (n 3), 40-52. 
238 Chiara Gior;getti 
the application of the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation, 
calls for provisions in treaty not to be meaningless, but to have a 
effect; second, the adoption of an 'evolntive approach'46 to treaty interpreta-
tion which takes into account the development of international relations and 
international law, and is not static; andthird, reference to Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which requires judges to take 
into account, together with the context of 'any relevant rules of international 
Jaw applicable in the relationships between the parties'.47 
Decisions of international courts and tribunals can also enter the decision-
making equation directly as a source oflaw, in application of Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute which international tribunals routinely use to identifY the sources 
of law. Article 38 provides that courts can use 'judicial decisions' as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.48 Importantly; decisions of inter-
national courts and tribunals can also be cited as evidence of custom and 
general principles of law, as noted in several of the general examples analysed 
above.49 Courts may not always be explicit as to how they cite decisions of 
other courts. 50 International courts can also reference decisions of other 
international courts simply as one of the examples supporting their argu-
ments. The final outcome of a case will be stronger and possibly more accept-
able to all parties if it reflects an approach that is common to other 
international proceedings. 
Normatively, cross-fertilisation is not without its critics. First, some could 
argue that seeking support from decisions of other courts does not serve the 
interests of the parties in the proceedings and may increase uncertainty.51 
However, cross-fertilisation among international courts is gradually resulting 
in the development of common principles and a common understanding of 
international procedural law, and hence, it is increasing, not decreasing, 
certainty and predictability which are important for all parties. 
46 Brown (n 3), 46. 
47 Art 31, 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 311 (entered into 
force 27 January 1980). 
411 Art 38 provides the generally recognised formulation of the traditional sources of interna-
tionallaw. Art 38, ICJ Statute (stating, inter alia that 'l. The Court, whose function is to decide 
in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply [ ... ] judi-
cial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.'). 
49 See ibid, para l ('The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: [ ... ] b. international custom, as evidence of 
a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.'). 
50 This is an interesting issue but it is outside the scope of this chapter. 
51 G Guillaume, 'The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators' (2001) 2 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 5 (noting that 'if judicial decisions are never fully 
predictable, they should never be arbitrary.'). 
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others may argne that international courts should not create new 
J ~>wceclural standards, as this should remain the domain of the law 
As explained in this chapter, however, courts operate in the strict 
of tl1eir constitutive instruments and rules of procedure. Cross-fertil-
is the result of the application of rules of interpretation and norms 
to tl1e sources of law, and is therefore permissible in international law. 
constitutive instruments are created by compromise, and are at 
necessarily ambiguous. Besides, it is not possible to include detailed 
that can neatly cover all possible fact patterns. Cross-fertilisation is 
mr>ortarlt. but it is also necessary to the functioning of international 
a more subtle criticism of cross-fertilisation relates to the fact that 
esser1ti:illy unsystematic. Decisions of any international court or tribunal 
be cited in support of a procedural decision of another court, as long 
cited decision is relevant to the issue in question. This is a valid ctiti-
but it is the inevitable by-product of the unsystematic natnre of the 
erntation:al dispute resolution system. As such, cross-fertilisation tries to 
order in the ffiaos by signalling common understandings and inter-
.Sil~fic:mtly in fact, this continuous cross-citation has resulted in impor-
of procedural rules among courts and tribunals, and 
in harmonising rules across different courts. Systematically, this 
fegra~ion has created stronger courts and trib1mals and has reduced the 
uncertainty that different standards and procedures have created, and 
therefore, positively served the interest of the parties. What is essential to 
e C<Jntimring validity of this method is that cross-fertilisation occurs within 
tl1e rules of interpretation and exisdng rules relating to the 
V. CONCLUSION 
chapter has focused on the phenomenon of cross-fertilisation in deci-
on procedural matters by international courts and tribunals, whereby 
increasingly cite one another's practice and adopt comparative methods 
analogies and disdnctions in order to identifY legal standards. Two 
categories of cross-fertilisation have been analysed - citations of other 
ten1a~tonal courts and tribunals used to support an exisdng standard by the 
tribunal on one side, and citations of decisions of other international 
On the practice of procedural gap-filling, and its possible legitimacy fmmdcd on the inher-
powers of international tribunals, see the chapter by Hlippo :Fontanclli and Paolo Busco in 
· volume, and the bibliography cited therein. 
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courts and tribunals used to modifY the standard used by the deciding court. 
In both cases, citations can be to general decisions by courts and tribunals or 
to specific conclusions or tribunals. Notably, certain calls for cbanges origi-
nate first in dissenting or separate opinions, and are then adopted by the 
majority of the court and/or by other international courts and tribunals as 
well. 
Citations to decisions of other courts are used as a source of law and 
generally as one of the ways to support a rnling of the court. As Brown 
observes 'if customary international law, general principles of law, judicial 
decisions and the writings of publicists are sources of the substantive rules of 
international law, there is no reason why they might not also serve as a source 
of the procedural rules of international law'. 53 Remarkably, while this analy· 
sis has only focused on specific examples, the systemic importance of cross-
fertilisation is general. Cross-fertilisation is a common occurrence and a 
significant methodological tool to create and strengthen international proce-
dural decisions. 
53 Brown (n 3), 37. 
